eCommons@AKU
Community Health Sciences

Department of Community Health Sciences

April 2003

Clinical decision making Part I: errors of
commission and omission
F White
Aga Khan University

D Nanan
Aga Khan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.aku.edu/pakistan_fhs_mc_chs_chs
Recommended Citation
White, F., Nanan, D. (2003). Clinical decision making Part I: errors of commission and omission. Journal of Pakistan Medical
Association, 53(4), 157-159.
Available at: https://ecommons.aku.edu/pakistan_fhs_mc_chs_chs/411

Clinical Decision Making Part I: Errors of
Commission and Omission
F. White,D. Nanan ( Department of Community Health Sciences, The Aga Khan University,
Karachi. )

Introduction
Clinical decision making refers to any act of diagnosis that leads to a decision regarding
prognosis, treatment, referral, or counseling. Diagnosis itself passes through a series of
stages, beginning with the assessment of symptoms. However, the meaning of symptoms
varies greatly with the context. For example, diagnostic outcomes for cough presenting in
general practice differ from those seen in the context of a chest clinic. Persons presenting
with severe headache at a neurology clinic are more likely to have a brain tumor than
those presenting with a similar complaint in an emergency clinic.
In light of presenting symptoms, the clinician then proceeds to the stage of diagnostic
hypotheses, generally restricting the serious possibilities to less than four (said to relate
more to the limitations of short term memory than to the intrinsic validity of any such
restriction).1 He or she then attempts to use available evidence to differentiate among
these hypotheses. Ideally, this leads to isolating a single diagnostic entity. Consequent
upon this, a prognosis is made, and a course of treatment identified. However, potential
for error exists at all stages in this process, and actions, whether valid or invalid, have
consequences.

The Use and Abuse of Frequency Statistics
That statistics influence perceptions in medical practice has long been recognized.
Almost 50 years ago, one exponent told the following story2 of a friend who came one
day and asked, "A member of my family has to be hospitalized. How can I tell what
hospital to put him in?" Being head of a hospital activity study at the time, he answered,
"We'll just see which hospital is the safest to go into. We have 15 hospitals which have
been contributing some data. Let's see which reports the greatest percentages of
recoveries on discharge." He drew attention to Hospital #1, where 92% of patients
recovered and Hospital #14, where only 28% recovered, and stated: "Obviously, there
isn't any sense in going to Hospital 14, you've only got a 1 in 4 chance of getting out of
there cured!"
The author then conceded the inherent oversimplification, pointing out that if frequency
statistics are to help in decision making, words must mean the same in every setting, and
statistics must be accurate and reflect actual practice.2 Since then, even more important
issues have been recognized, such as the critical relevance of caseload characteristics: is
it a general hospital or a referral hospital? is it private or public sector? do patients arrive
with similar or different prognostic profiles? These considerations pertain to what may be
termed the "prior probability" of differing outcomes.

For example, in most countries public sector health care administrators are required to
balance demand for different types of services against the available and finite supply of
resources. This usually results in a limited availability and turnaround for certain
procedures and services while maintaining affordability for a wide cross-section of the
catchment population. Therefore, is it ever reasonable to compare health outcomes of a
public sector hospital with those of a private sector hospital, without first taking account
of pre-admission prognosis? The issues include: socioeconomic spectrum of people
accessing health care from a given source, the stage at which disease presents (is it more
or less advanced), and how much will cost of medication be a barrier. These same issues
are equally relevant when comparing one physician's practice with another; those serving
wealthier patients will inevitably achieve apparently more favorable outcomes than those
who are dealing mostly with poor patients. Frequency statistics therefore are merely
numbers: for interpretation they must be placed in context, and only after controlling for
the relevant factors can valid comparisons be made.
The Role of Moral Judgements in Medical Diagnosis
The human factor in clinical decision making in the face of uncertainty has also received
attention. Especially in the absence of evidence, informal norms (or "rules of thumb") are
often adopted in medical diagnosis. The most important norm has long been recognized:
"that judging a sick person well is more to be avoided than judging a well person sick".3
By contrast, an opposite analogy of common law in the face of uncertainty holds that: "A
man is innocent until proven guilty"; in effect, the judge must find compelling evidence
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The error to avoid is to erroneously convict, as in the
dictum, "Better a thousand guilty men go free, than one innocent man be convicted".
Unlike common law, whose foundations rest on a null hypothesis of innocence, the
medical profession traditionally abides by a converse rule. Because medicine is
concerned mostly with people in the "sick role", the null hypothesis, Ho ("H nought"), is
usually taken as no difference between the individual being assessed and others with the
disease; after all, physicians deal most of the time with people who are not well, such that
"not well" is the operational norm. Little wonder therefore that the medical model is more
noted for its obsession with illness than its interest in health; it is virtually designed to do
so! However, although the magnitude of the bias towards intervention in a given case
may be small, if multiplied across a population it can have effects of large magnitude.
Interestingly, compared with law, medicine offers more leeway with its rule, such as
"When in doubt, observe and/or delay your decision". This option however, is acceptable
only when delay is unlikely to lead to catastrophic outcome, and may entail an offsetting
consideration such as potential adverse consequences of taking immediate action.
The Role of Statistical Inference
To examine this question more closely, we invoke inferential statistics. Taking a clinical
null hypothesis (i.e. no difference between the person being assessed and others with the
disease), and basing our decisions on clinical/diagnostic testing, we are liable to make
two types of errors. Based on their test results, we may decide that a person does not have

the disease, and thus reject the clinical Ho, when in fact Ho is true (i.e. the individual is
truly sick); this is construed as a Type 1 error. Alternatively, deciding that the person has
the disease thereby accepting Ho, when the individual is truly well is termed a Type 2
error. These two errors can occur by chance alone, and with predictable frequency
depending on the "normal range" we set for the test results for the population under
consideration. To repeat, to reject a null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true is
called a Type 1 error. By contrast, to fail to reject, or to accept the null hypothesis when it
is false is termed a Type 2 error. Such errors occur routinely in clinical practice. The
problem is that it is impossible to tell if we are making a Type 1 or a Type 2 error.
From a purely neutral perspective, Ho may be taken on the basis of either health or
disease, but such neutral positions rarely apply in health care. In fact, most physicians
learn early in training that it is far more culpable to dismiss a truly sick patient as being
well, than to classify a well person as sick. Theoretically, what one takes as Ho is
assumed at the outset: Ho may be taken to mean that disease is present unless
demonstrated otherwise, or conversely, Ho may be taken to mean that disease is absent.
More often than not, in clinical medicine (for the reason of medical morality as just
alluded), Ho assumes that disease is present. A common exception to this is screening,
where falsely "labeling" someone with a disease is now recognized as an issue; in this
situation, the null hypothesis of "health" is usually taken, and the implications of Type 1
and Type 2 error reverse.
Some Classics from the Literature on Diagnostic Errors
There are classics in the medical literature which illustrate the enormous force of the
decision rule when based on the null hypothesis of disease, and the greater acceptability
and predominance of Type 2 errors in clinical decision making. For example, as early as
1959, Garland summarized findings from a study of 14,867 radiographic films for
tuberculosis.4 In this series there were 1,216 positive readings which turned out to be
clinically negative (Type 2 errors) and only 24 negative readings which turned out to be
clinically active (Type 1 errors). Type 2 errors in this series therefore were found to be
about 50 times more acceptable than that of Type 1 errors!
Rules of thumb however, can propagate Type 2 errors to virtually outrageous proportions.
To illustrate, take Bakwin's classical 1945 study of tonsillectomy for 1,000 school
children.5 Of these children, 611 had had their tonsils removed. The remaining 389 were
then examined by other physicians, and 174 (44.7%) selected for tonsillectomy. This left
215 children with apparently normal tonsils. Another group of doctors was then assigned
to examine these 215 children, and 99 of them (46%) were judged in need of
tonsillectomy. Still another group of doctors was then employed to examine the
remaining children, and nearly one half were recommended for operation.
These examples illustrate several issues: 1) the null hypothesis of disease and therefore
Type 2 error dominates; 2) clinical diagnostic practices can amount to little more than
ritual (in the previous example, an apparent "rule of halves"); 3) errors propagate; 4) it
takes courage to buck a trend in medical practice; and 5) the surgical equivalent of the

maxim "when in doubt, diagnose illness", could be stated as "when in doubt, take it out".
Or perhaps more generally, "it is better to be damned for doing something than for doing
nothing". This is not medical science.
The history lessons do not end there. For many years after this study was reported,
tonsillectomy remained popular. However, this was also accompanied by great ignorance
on the physiological role of the tonsils, assumed by many to be residual lymphoid tissue
that performed little useful function. Only after large scale epidemiological studies of
persons whose tonsils had been removed, did it become apparent that such individuals
had a statistically higher risk of childhood leukemia, Hodgkins disease, inflammatory
bowel disease and rheumatoid arthritis, all suggesting a relationship to the importance of
a fully intact immune system. While more work is required to elucidate such associations,
they caution us to avoid arbitrary rules of thumb. Although there are legitimate reasons
for tonsillectomy, which is done less frequently today, a recent study of variations in
surgical rates revealed a higher risk of undergoing tonsillectomy among the general
population when there were no medical friends or relatives than when there were.6 At
least some of the general public, at least those who are friends and relatives of doctors it
seems, have got the message.
However, aside from some surgical procedures, it might be argued that medical
diagnosis, unlike law, is not an irreversible act that can do untold damage to the status
and reputation of the patient. Yet, is this assumption warranted? Consider the physician
who suspects epilepsy in a truck driver: his patient will probably never drive a truck
again if the diagnosis is made known to the licensing authorities. On the other hand, if he
does drive, and has a seizure on the road, many people could be hurt. Similarly, some
psychiatric diagnoses can have long term effects on a person's social standing. Consider
also the dentist who tests positive on screening for hepatitis B or HIV. Such errors can
indeed have consequences, and for this reason confirmatory tests are required.
In fact, it may improve our clinical rigour if, in addition to clinically interesting cases at
Grand Rounds, we also had regular sessions focusing on errors in clinical practice. These
would consider conditions under which errors are more likely to occur, what type of
errors, and their consequences, taking into account the condition being assessed, and type
of physician involved, including type of training as error distribution will differ across
disciplines, and none will be found immune to errors. Similarly, the individual
circumstances of patients, such as educational background and ability to pay, will have a
bearing on error rates, as these may affect their pretest likelihood of disease and quality
of care. The organizational setting is also relevant, as patient volume, financing system,
and cultural setting are also likely to influence outcome.
In addition, system differences can profoundly affect results. For example, the US system
of "fee for service" and high litigation rates produces more "errors of commission"
related to excessive numbers of procedures, whereas in the UK system of "capitation",
where physicians are paid salaries in proportion to the number of registered patients
(regardless of clinical activity), there are more "errors of omission", or failure to take
action. In either setting this can be viewed as "rational economic behavior".
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